We consider a retailer with limited inventory of identically priced, substitutable products. Customers arrive sequentially and the firm decides which subset of products to offer to each arriving customer depending on the customer's preferences, the inventory levels, and the remaining time in the season. If the customer base is homogeneous with respect to their product preferences, then it is optimal to offer all available products to any arriving customer. However, with multiple customer segments characterized by different product preferences, it may be optimal to limit the choice set of some customers (even when the products are in stock). That is, it may be optimal to reserve products with low inventory levels for future customers who may have a stronger preference for those products. In certain settings, we prove that the optimal assortment policy is a threshold policy under which a product is offered to a customer segment if its inventory level is higher than a threshold value. The threshold levels are decreasing in time and increasing in the inventory levels of other products. We test the impact of assortment customization using data from a large fashion retailer. We find that the revenue impact of assortment customization can be significant, especially when customer heterogeneity is high and when the products' inventory-to-demand ratios are asymmetric. Our findings suggest that assortment customization can be used as another lever for revenue maximization in addition to pricing. (Key words: revenue management, retail assortment planning, inventory rationing, customer segmentation, mixed logit model ) 
Introduction
Online retailing continues to be the retail industry's growth engine. In the last decade, online retailers have heavily invested in diverse technologies, such as sophisticated analytics and personalization tools. In contrast to traditional bricks-and-mortar stores, online retailers can not only easily collect personal information, but they can also record their customers' purchase histories. As a result, online retailers are able to send personalized promotions or display customized recommendations to individual customers based on their personal information and browsing and purchasing history, which can effectively enhance the customers' shopping experience and influence their purchasing activities. For example, Amazon.com's website, like many other online retailers' websites, requires a customer to log in using her/his account before making a purchase. This allows the company to track the customer's personal information and purchase history. Based on this data, the company can estimate the customer's preferences on styles, colors, and other features of a product. An online retailer can use this information to customize the set of products made available to customers.
While websites typically display a selection of product options over multiple pages, the products on the first few pages tend to receive more attention. Therefore, the company may be able to control the selection of products offered to a customer by restricting the set of product variants displayed in the first few pages of the search results. In addition, the company can more directly exercise that control by selecting a product's "in-stock" or "out-of-stock" status information displayed to customers. This idea also applies to hotel consolidators such as www.hotel-savers.com that purchase blocks of inventory (e.g., hotel rooms) from 25,000 hotels in 5,000 cities to sell through their websites. These resellers may be able to maximize sales by choosing the right set of products offered to each customer. The travel websites collect information about their customers' purchase histories and preferences, and have access to many products (e.g., hotels) with different inventory levels in the customer's desired price range. 1 In this paper, we argue that, in settings with limited inventory, providing customized assortments to individual customers has the potential to increase revenues for online retailers.
In this paper, we consider a firm that sells multiple products in a retail category. There are limited inventories of the products to sell over a finite selling season. The selling prices of the products are all equal. The customer base is heterogeneous and characterized by multiple segments with different product preference distributions. These segments are essentially customer clusters with similar purchase histories as described in Linden et al. (2003) . We use the Multinomial Logit framework to model the choice process of each customer. The retailer can identify the segment an arriving customer belongs to and customize the assortment to that particular customer without incurring additional cost. The customer then selects a product among those in the offered assortment or selects the no-purchase option. We formulate this as a dynamic assortment optimization problem in which the assortment decisions depend on the inventory levels, the current customer's segment, and the distribution of preferences of future customers. In this setting, we find that the firm has the potential to increase revenues by strategically restricting the set of product options it makes available to customers, even when all products are in stock. In other words, the company may conceal a product short on inventory by showing it as out-of-stock, in anticipation of future sales to other customers who may have a stronger preference for this product (and who may therefore walk away if that product is not available).
We first characterize the optimal dynamic assortment policy for a setting with a single customer segment. In this case, it is optimal to offer the entire (in-stock) assortment to any arriving customer because all future customers have the same preference distribution as the current customer. We then consider settings with multiple customer segments. We begin by isolating the impact of inventory levels and customer heterogeneity to understand their effect on the incidence of assortment customization. To this end, we consider two settings -one with symmetric product demands but arbitrary inventory levels, and one with equal inventory levels but asymmetric customer segments.
We show that, in each setting, it may be optimal to ration products to some customer segments.
In the first setting, rationing applies to products with low inventory levels. In the second setting, customers with larger consideration sets (i.e., that have more products in their choice sets) tend to be rationed those products preferred by customers with smaller consideration sets.
We then characterize the optimal assortment policy in a setting with two products and two customer segments. We show that the optimal policy is a threshold-type policy. In particular, a segment's less preferred product variant is offered only if that product's inventory level is above a certain threshold value. This threshold is decreasing in time. In other words, as time approaches the end of the selling season, it is more likely to offer the two products to both customer segments.
The threshold is also increasing in the inventory level of the segment's most preferred product.
This implies that both products are more likely to be offered if a customer's most preferred product variant has only a few remaining units in stock.
We demonstrate the potential revenue impact of assortment customization with a case study based on data from a high-end Turkish fashion retailer that operates online and offline channels.
This company buys high-end fashion products well in advance of the selling season and sells them at full price until the clearance season. We have weekly item-level sales (units and prices) and inventory data for the category of women's shoes from the Fall-Winter 2011-2012 season. There are significant differences in the preferences of customers from three distinct regions in Turkey. Thus, we use address indicators and choice of store for offline purchases to create three customer segments.
We demonstrate the potential impact of assortment customization by setting the parameters of our model based on the actual demand and inventory data and by comparing the expected profit from assortment customization with the benchmark policy that involves offering all available products to any arriving customer in every period. We find that inventory-demand imbalances tend to emerge early in the season and employing assortment customization can lead to significantly higher revenues in those cases. Specifically, in this study, the revenue benefit from assortment customization can be as high as 5% relative to the benchmark policy.
The literature on revenue management has shown that inventory rationing is optimal in settings in which either selling prices or backordering costs are different across customer groups (see Section 2). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that inventory rationing arises despite the fact that all products' selling prices and costs are equal. In this case, inventory rationing is due to the heterogeneity in customer preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model formulation. Section 4 analyzes the optimal dynamic assortment policy. Section 5 discusses the impact of assortment customization in a case study. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are provided in Appendices A and B.
Literature Review
Our work is related to three streams of research. The first one is the literature on retail assortment planning, with papers focusing on assortment and inventory decisions for a single customer segment. estimating the product preferences of households and propose that web retailers such as Net Grocer and Peapod could offer customized assortments to each household -rather than the full assortment -to reduce the search cost of customers, which has been shown to negatively influence sales.
The second related stream of research includes work on choice-based network revenue management. Zhang and Cooper (2005) study revenue maximization in a setting where customers choose from a set of parallel flights. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) describe a framework for choicebased network revenue management models with multiple products (itineraries) and components (flight-legs), where product prices can be markedly different. The authors characterize the optimal assortment policy for settings in which all products share the same resource (aircraft capacity for one flight-leg). As in other revenue management papers with a single flight-leg, the optimal policy is a booking-limit based policy, under which some products with lower fare prices are not offered if the remaining capacity is low. In these models, the products command different prices but share the same resources. In contrast, each product variant has its own dedicated inventory in our setting. choice probabilities for the different products, and these products are sold at different prices (i.e., fare-route options). However, in these papers, the decision maker cannot observe the type of an arriving customer and therefore, at any given time, all customers are offered the same assortment (which is a list of fare class and route combinations). Hence, customization is not possible in those settings and the optimal assortment decisions are based on aggregate choice probabilities across segments, inventory levels, and price differences between products.
Cross-selling is commonly used to maximize revenues by online retailers. pricing. Personalized pricing is also closely related to price discrimination, which has been studied extensively in the marketing literature. Price discrimination is achieved by offering a vertically differentiated product line (Mussa and Rosen 1978) and by offering product bundles (e.g., Fay and Xie 2008). Usually, in these settings, a static assortment is offered to all customers.
The ability of a company to limit the assortment to its customers is a form of inventory rationing. Therefore, our paper is also related to research on this topic. Ha (1997a) considers a single-item, make-to-stock production system with several demand classes (characterized by the different prices they are willing to pay) and lost sales, and demonstrates that the optimal policy is characterized by rationing levels for each demand class. Ha (1997b) 
Model Formulation
We consider a retailer that sells a set of product variants within a retail category over a finite There are M customer segments characterized by different product preferences. We model customer preferences using a Mixed Logit model. That is, each arriving customer belongs to a segment with a certain probability and the choice process of all customers in a segment follows a specific Multinomial Logit (MNL) model. 2 Given an assortment S ∈ N , the utility derived from choosing product i ∈ S for a customer in segment m is u mi + ξ mi , where u mi is the expected utility derived from product i and ξ mi is a random variable representing the heterogeneity of utilities across customers in the same segment. In addition, customers can always choose not to purchase any product, receiving a utility u m0 + ξ m0 . Each customer chooses the product that offers the maximum utility. We assume that ξ mi are i.i.d. random variables following a Gumbel distribution with mean zero and variance π 2 /6. The probability of a customer choosing product i that arises from this utility maximization problem is given by preference for the no-purchase option, i.e., θ m0 = θ 0 > 0. Each of the M customer segments has a different preference vector. We assume that the retailer knows the preference vector for each customer segment. The retailer is able to estimate these preferences based on the customers' purchase history. Mixed Logit models are commonly used by retailers and marketing firms to identify multiple latent customer segments in the customer base and to estimate purchasing behavior for each segment (see, e.g., Gupta and Chintagunta 1994 and Wedel and Kamakura 1998). A common approach in online retailing is collaborative filtering (Linden et al. 2003) , which measures similarity of customers to each other based on past history and infers preferences of an arriving customer for the category of interest. For example, Travelocity classifies customers into business and family/leisure segments based on the dates of travel and number of people traveling, as specified in the search process.
We consider a Poisson arrival process and assume that at most one customer arrives in each period. The sequence of events in each period is as follows: At the beginning of the period, a consumer arrives with probability λ and the arriving customer belongs to segment m with proba-
Because of the identification process that takes place upon arrival, the retailer has perfect information on the customer's segment. The retailer offers an assortment (subset of the available products) to the customer. Next, the customer makes a purchasing decision according to the choice process and the revenue is received if a product is sold. One can allow for an additional generic segment with product preferences matching those of the general population.
If there is no sales history or information on the identity of a particular customer, this customer would be assumed to belong to this generic segment.
To isolate the effect of customer heterogeneity, we focus on a model with identical prices for all products, denoted by p. In a setting with non-identical prices, there is a clear incentive for rationing (e.g., not offering a lower-priced product at certain levels of inventory) even with a homogeneous customer base. In practice, the price of a product is usually the same for all variants within categories of horizontally differentiated products, supporting the assumption of identical prices in our context. We also assume that a product's price is the same for all customers, that is, we do not consider dynamic customized pricing of individual products. It is a matter of debate whether customized pricing is legal with respect to antitrust laws (Ramasastry 2005) . As an example, in 2000, Amazon.com acknowledged that it had presented different prices to different customers in its DVD store for experimentation purposes, but denied that it did so on the basis of any past purchasing behavior at Amazon.
Finally, without loss of generality, we assume that the salvage value for unsold units at the end of the season is zero. We use the following notation throughout the paper. We let e i denote the i th unit vector. In addition, we let S(y) be the set of products with positive inventory and denote the cardinality of set S as |S|.
The Dynamic Assortment Optimization Problem
Define the value function in period t as V t (y|m), given the vector of inventories y and that the customer arriving in this period is in segment m. Taking expectation across all customer segments, the value function at the beginning of period t is given by
Provided that the current arriving customer is in segment m, the goal is to select an assortment to maximize revenues for the current period and for the rest of the season. Therefore, the optimality equation is given by
The term inside the brackets is the value function for an arriving customer in segment m (an arrival occurs with probability λ). For a given choice of assortment S, this term accounts for the probability of selling one unit of product i in S, earning a revenue of p from the sale plus the revenue-to-go function in period t + 1 evaluated at the current inventory level minus the unit sold in period t. The term also accounts for the possibility that the customer does not make a purchase, in which case the revenue is the profit-to-go function in period t + 1 evaluated at the current vector of inventory levels. We maximize this term over all possible subsets of variants with positive inventories. The last term is the future value function if no customer arrives (with probability 1 − λ). Because the products prices are equal, it is optimal to sell as many units of any product as possible throughout the selling season. Let S * mt (y) denote the optimal assortment for a segment m customer at time t given inventory levels y. The total optimal revenue over the selling season is given by V 1 (y 0 ). The terminal condition of this dynamic program is the value function in period T . Because there are no more customers beyond the last period, the optimal policy is to offer all products with positive inventory to any arriving customer. Therefore,
This formulation leads to a dynamic program with an N -dimensional state space and a large action space (for each segment, there are 2 |S(y)| possible assortments that can be offered). Thus, the above dynamic assortment optimization problem is intractable for large N and M . Note that the myopic solution to this dynamic program (which maximizes the current period reward ignoring the impact on future revenues) is to offer all products in every period, thus maximizing the probability of sales to any arriving customer. This policy serves as a benchmark for the value of dynamic assortment customization. We next discuss general properties of the optimal policy.
as the marginal expected revenue generated by the y i -th unit of inventory of product i in period t + 1.
We rewrite the optimality equation in (1) as
If product i is offered and sold in period t, then the revenue consists of the price p minus the lost opportunity revenue of selling this unit after period t, given by Δ i t+1 (y). We denote the effective marginal price of product i in period t as
Consider an ordering of the products in period t given inventory levels y so that
Based on this ordering, we define a set consisting of the products with the largest effective marginal prices, given by
The next result shows that the optimal assortment for each customer segment is restricted to one of N possible sets A i (y).
Lemma 1 Given inventory levels y in period t, the optimal assortment for a segment m customer is given by S
Lemma 1 is similar to Theorem 1 in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), although our setting involves an N -dimensional state-space (representing the separate inventories for each product) as opposed to a single resource in their setting. We utilize this result in the numerical computation of the solution to the dynamic program as it allows us to reduce the size of the action space in each period from 2 N to N . The result suggests that the sets A k (y) are nested (in particular, product i 1 is offered to any customer arriving in period t).
In the remainder of this section, we develop structural results of the optimal policy. We first consider the case of a single customer segment, i.e., M = 1. As expected, it is optimal to offer all products in each period in this setting. We next formalize this result.
Proposition 1 Consider a setting with a single customer segment and N products. In each period,
it is optimal to offer any arriving customer all products with positive inventory.
Because customers are homogeneous in this setting, all future customers have the same preferences as the current arriving customer in expectation, so the firm cannot benefit from reserving a product in anticipation of future sales. We also note that if the inventory level of a product i is large relative to the remaining time-horizon -more specifically, if y i ≥ T − t + 1 -then it is optimal to offer this product to all segments. Assortment customization is profitable when there is heterogeneity in the customer base and when there is a limited amount of inventory of some or all of the available products.
To understand the factors that induce rationing, we next consider two settings that isolate the effects of limited inventory and customer heterogeneity, respectively, on the optimal dynamic assortment policy. Consider first a situation in which products' demands are symmetric (this condition is formalized in the statement of Proposition 2 below) and inventory levels are not.
The result shows that products with lower inventory levels tend to be rationed to more customer segments.
Proposition 2 (Impact of Inventory Levels) Consider a setting with N products and M customer segments, but with symmetric product demands. Specifically, assume that
for any two subsets S, S and any two products l, l , with l ∈ S, l ∈ S (or l = l = 0), and |S| = |S |. This result indicates that, when product demands are symmetric, the optimal dynamic assortment policy is a threshold policy. Therefore, products low in inventory may be rationed to some customer segments. The thresholds may change over time and across different customer segments.
The condition in Proposition 2 ensures that aggregate demand for each product is the same, regardless of the specific set of products in the assortment. with the highest inventory levels. In that way, the firm reserves the more inventory-constrained products for those potential future customers that would not make a purchase if those products
were not available.
The next result focuses on a setting with equal inventory levels, but asymmetric customer demand. In particular, we consider a scenario in which customer segments are nested in the sense that they increasingly incorporate more products in their consideration set. We show that, despite there being an equal amount of inventory of every product, it may be optimal to ration products to segments with relatively larger consideration sets. To facilitate the analysis, we consider a vector of inventory levels with y i = 1 for all i ∈ N . that customers in segments with larger consideration sets are rationed more products than customers who have a narrower preference for products. Indeed, it is more likely to ration the more sought-after products because customers with a larger consideration set may purchase one of the other products in the offered assortment. Furthermore, if product k is not offered to segment m, then that product is not offered to segment m + 1.
We next characterize the optimal dynamic assortment policy in a setting with two products, two customer segments, and arbitrary inventory levels and customer preferences. This setting combines the effects of limited inventory and customer heterogeneity. Under both Scenario A and Scenario B, the optimal assortment policy in period t is as follows.
If only one product is available, then it is optimal to offer that product to any arriving customer.
If both products are available, then:
(i) Product i is always in the optimal assortment set for segment i, i.e., i ∈ S * it (y).
(ii) For a segment i customer, there exists a threshold level y * jt (y i ) such that:
The result shows that a customer from segment i is always offered product i in the optimal dynamic assortment policy. Furthermore, a segment i customer is also offered product j if the inventory level of that product is large enough. Otherwise, the customer is only offered product i.
This policy is characterized by a set of threshold levels y * it and y * jt in each period t.
The optimal policy in both scenarios involves inventory rationing. In Scenario A, a customer is always offered its most preferred product. For an arriving customer of segment i, if the inventory level of product j is low, it may be optimal to reserve that inventory for future arriving customers of segment j, since those customers are more likely to leave without purchasing any product if product j is not available. In Scenario B, it is possible that segment 2 customers are not offered their most preferred product (which is also the most preferred product of segment 1 customers).
Whether or not product 1 is rationed to segment 2 customers is determined by a threshold. If the inventory level for product 1 is low, then that product is reserved for segment 1 customers as their preference for that product relative to product 2 is stronger than the relative product preferences of segment 2 customers. Rationing may apply to a segment's most preferred product in this scenario -this is driven by the relative strength of product preferences for each customer segment (and not simply by the order of their preferences). We next present an example to further expand on the intuition behind this result.
Example 1
Consider the second to last period before the end of the horizon, i.e., period t = T −1, and let y = (y 1 = 1, y 2 = 2). Suppose that a customer from segment 2 arrives in period T − 1 and consider the realization of her preferences for the three options -purchase product 1, purchase product 2, or not purchase any product. If the customer's highest realized preference is either to purchase product 2 or the no-purchase option, then not offering product 1 has no effect on current or future revenues. Now, consider the case where the customer's first (realized) choice is product 1. If the offered assortment is S 2,T −1 = {1, 2}, then the customer buys product 1, yielding a revenue of p + V T (0, 2) . If the offered assortment is S 2,T −1 = {2}, then the customer will either buy product 2 (with probability θ 22 / (θ 0 + θ 22 )), yielding a revenue of p + V T (1, 1), or will choose the no-purchase option, yielding a revenue of V T (1, 2). Note that V T (1, 2) = V T (1, 1) and V T (0, 2) = V T (0, 1), because the firm can sell at most one unit in the last period. Hence, the assortment S 2,T −1 = {1, 2} yields a revenue of p + V T (0, 1) and S 2,T −1 = {2} yields a revenue of 1) . With S 2,T −1 = {2}, the firm loses some revenue in the current period, but it gains V T (1, 1) − V T (0, 1) in the last period. Thus, depending on the choice probabilities and the size of the segments, S 2,T −1 = {2} could be the optimal solution -implying rationing product 1. This will be the case, for example, when θ 22 is high relative to θ 0 or when segment 1 is relatively large (ρ 1 is close to one). In such cases, it is optimal to direct the segment 2 customer to buy product 2, reserving product 1 for the last period.
To conclude the characterization of the optimal policy, we discuss monotonicity properties of the threshold levels introduced in Theorem 1.
Proposition 4 Consider a setting with N = M = 2 and preference vectors given as in Scenario
A or Scenario B above. Then, the policy thresholds satisfy the following properties.
(ii) The threshold levels are decreasing in t.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 implies that, given inventory levels y i and y j , if assortment {i, j} is offered to segment j, then it is also optimal to offer the full assortment to segment j for lower inventory levels of product j. Part (ii) suggests that towards the end of the selling season, there is more incentive to offer both variants to any arriving customer. Figure 1 below illustrates these properties. Figure 1(a) shows the threshold values for both customer segments in a given period t, each as a function of the inventory level of the segment's most preferred product. These thresholds divide the inventory (y 1 , y 2 ) space in three regions. In the upper-left region, segment 1 is offered both products, but it is optimal to ration product 1 to an arriving customer of segment 2. The reverse situation arises in the lower-right region. In the center-right region of the graph, any arriving customer is offered both products. As shown in Proposition 4(i), both threshold levels are increasing. Thus, for a given inventory level of product 2, it is more likely to offer that product to an arriving customer of segment 1 when the inventory level of product 1 is low. In this case, it may be optimal to re-direct some segment 1 customers to purchase product 2 in order to reduce the likelihood of running out of stock of product 1 in the future. On the other hand, when the inventory level of product 1 is high, it may be optimal to offer only product 1 to an arriving customer of segment 1, thereby increasing the demand for that product. 
Value of Dynamic Assortment Customization
In this section, we demonstrate the potential impact of assortment customization on revenue with a case study. We measure the impact on revenue of employing the optimal policy by calculating the percentage revenue increase due to assortment customization relative to a benchmark (myopic) policy under which all available products are offered to any arriving customer.
Beymen is a privately held upscale fashion retailer in Turkey, with revenues of $400 million per annum. The retailer operates 21 department stores and mono-brand stores in Turkey, and an online sales channel. Beymen places orders from the wholesale arms of high-end fashion brands with firm purchasing commitments six to eight months in advance of the beginning of each season.
There are two main buying cycles every year, resulting in two distinct selling seasons: Fall-Winter and Spring-Summer. There is little to no replenishment opportunity during the season for most of the brands, and leftover inventory at the end of the season is liquidated at outlet stores.
The company's buyers make product assortment and chain-level inventory decisions (at brand level and at style level) to minimize the occurrence of stockouts and the cost of left over inventory.
However, demand, especially at the style level, is highly uncertain and inventory imbalances start to emerge after the first few weeks of the season. Because the markdown period starts only at the end of the sixth month of the season, the merchandising team reviews the remaining inventory to demand ratios every week and tries to shape demand using various methods. One method is based on incentives given to the sales people at stores to direct customers to certain brand/product groups. This works because, in high-end fashion, sales people have significant influence on a customer's purchasing behavior as they are an integral part of the browsing and decision-making process. Moreover, sales people know many of the customers from past purchases. Another method involves pushing some product groups in the online channel, either by showing them more prominently on opening pages or assign higher rankings in customer search results. Finally, during the markdown period, the company discounts products' prices based on the prevailing inventory levels. The firm uses this set of tools to manage the demand-inventory imbalance. The first two methods are in essence similar to the assortment customization idea proposed in this paper. We next provide details on the data used for this case study. 
Case Study 1
We first consider a study based on two products and three customer segments (i.e., N = 2, M = 3). The two products' SKUs are 100486728 and 100484123 (see Figure 3) . We can calculate reliable estimates of popularity of all items on week 44. We set q 0 = 0.2, θ 0 = 1, and solve for the set of preferences θ jk for all j, k, to satisfy the demand ratios of products and the no purchase probability, i.e.,
where thed jk estimates are obtained from the sales data. We have locations from week 44 to week 53 (as explained earlier, we use the data during the initial weeks to construct these demand estimates). The latter represent the available inventory of products 1 and 2, respectively, at the beginning of week 44. We set T = 100 and λ = 1 for the dynamic program, which means that T (1 − q 0 ) = 80 customers are expected to be willing to make a purchase, roughly matching the total estimated demand for the remaining weeks in the season.
Based on the data from this case study, Figure 4 below shows the percentage increase in revenue due to assortment customization as a function of the inventory levels. For the specific inventory combination on week 44 from the company's data, I 1 = 70, I 2 = 13, adopting assortment customization in that setting would result in a 2.78% increase in revenue relative to the myopic policy.
It can also be seen from the graph that when the inventory levels of both products are large, the percentage revenue impact is small. In that case, the retailer is less likely to run out of stock, so there is no need for rationing inventory. Similarly, when inventory levels of both products are low relative to the time horizon (low values of y 1 and y 2 in the graph), there is enough time to sell all units, so both products are likely to be offered in the optimal solution, and again the revenue impact is small. The revenue impact is more significant in the areas where the inventory level of one product is relatively high while the inventory level of the other product is relatively low (a maximum of 3.04% in this example). Because retailers usually operate with low profit margins, even a small percentage increase in revenue can have a significant impact on profit. I k for k = 1, . .., 4. We define the load factor as the ratio of total demand to total inventory (available on week 44), given by D/ 4 k=1 I k . We focus on 1,974 cases in which the load factor is between 0.8 and 1.3. We set q 0 = 0.1, θ 0 = 10, and solve for the set of preferences θ jk for all j, k, to satisfy the demand ratios of products and the no purchase probability, otherwise, inventory and demand are both scaled down in the same proportion.)
Note that the the load factor remains the same before and after the rescaling described above. Again, we note that the actual scale of demand and inventory levels can be much higher than those that can be achieved in a dynamic program with T = 50. Hence, we scaled inventory and demand down to achieve the actual load factor observed for the products with T = 50. Because multiple combinations of T and q 0 can achieve the same load factor, we have tested whether our conclusions are robust to the choices of T and q 0 . First, we have replicated the study for T = 100
and q 0 = 0.1 with the proper rescaling of inventories for a subsample of 300 experiments. This change doubles the expected number of customers and the inventory quantities. We find that the results are similar to those depicted in Figure 5 . In particular, the average benefit of assortment customization in the subsample is 1.04% (compared to 0.96% in the original experiment). Second,
we have replicated the analysis for T = 70 and q 0 = 1 − 45/70 = 0.357, keeping the inventory levels and the average number of customers willing to make a purchase the same as in the original study.
The average benefit of assortment customization in the subsample is 0.95% (compared to 0.96% in the original experiment). These tests suggest that the choice of T and q 0 are not critical as long as the load factors are similar to those derived from the actual observations. This validates the numerical findings and supports our claim that the potential revenue impact of assortment customization can be significant when the load factor is within a range around 1.
To measure the effect of segment sizes on the benefits of assortment customization, we define the following segment distance metric:
a more heterogenous population with three relatively equal-sized segments. A higher value of ρ dist implies a less heterogenous population concentrated primarily in one large segment (e.g., an extreme scenario would be ρ = (1, 0, 0)). We then group the 1,974 experiments into three equal sized groups with low, medium, and high values of the metric ρ dist . In this data set, segment 1 is generally larger than the other two segments combined (with a minimum value of ρ 1 = 0.54).
The minimum, average, and maximum ρ dist values are 0.41, 0.86, and 1.25. Figure 6 reports the average percentage gain from assortment customization for each group, controlling for the load factor. Although the net impact depends on the relationship between the sizes of the segments and the preference vectors of each segment, Figure 6 clearly suggests that the impact of assortment customization is highest in settings with more heterogeneous populations. This finding makes sense, as there would be no benefit to assortment customization if all customers belonged to the same segment (as in the extreme scenario with ρ = (1, 0, 0) ). 
Conclusion
We consider a retailer with limited inventory of substitutable products in a category with equal selling prices. The retailer faces a heterogeneous customer base, consisting of multiple segments that are characterized by different preferences for the products. The retailer can identify the segment of each arriving customer and can therefore offer a customized assortment based on that segment's preferences. For example, online retailers typically track information about their customers' product preferences by using their purchasing and browsing history. We formulate this problem as a dynamic assortment customization problem where the assortment decision depends on the inventory levels of the products, the time remaining in the season, the segment of the arriving customer and the distribution of preferences of future customers.
In the presence of a homogeneous customer base, it is optimal to offer all available products to any arriving customer. In contrast, with a heterogeneous customer base, it may not be optimal to offer all product variants to all customers -even if the products' prices are equal. For a setting with two products and two segments, we show that it is optimal to follow a threshold policy under which it is optimal to offer a product to a customer segment only if the inventory level of that product is higher than a threshold level. Otherwise, the product is not offered to that segment in order to reserve those units for future customers who may have a stronger preference for that product. This is a form of inventory rationing -restricting access of products to some customer segments. We show that the threshold levels are increasing in the other product's inventory level and decreasing in time, making customization (and rationing) less likely as the system runs out of inventory or time to sell the products. We also provide results about the structure of the optimal policy in settings with an arbitrary number of products and customer segments, including a setting with symmetric demand and a setting with equal inventory levels and nested customer segments.
We demonstrate the potential revenue impact of assortment customization with a case study based on a high-end retailer that operates online and offline channels. This study reveals the potential impact of assortment customization by comparing the expected profit derived from this policy with that of the benchmark policy that involves offering all available products to any arriving customer. Specifically, in this case study, the revenue benefit from assortment customization can be as high as 5% relative to the benchmark policy -such revenue increases can have a significant impact on profit.
Inventory rationing has been studied extensively in inventory and revenue management contexts and it generally arises due to price and cost differences between customer groups. Our model demonstrates that the heterogeneity in the customer preferences is another reason for rationing.
Moreover, assortment customization creates value for customers because it increases the chances that customers will find their preferred products in stock. In this paper, we have assumed identical product prices to isolate the effect of heterogeneous customer preferences. However, our results indicating the need for inventory rationing due to differences in customer preferences would also apply in more general settings. Consider the case of two products with non-identical prices p 1 > p 2 .
In this case, our results suggest that there could be an incentive to ration either product depending on their inventory levels. In the absence of heterogeneity in customer preferences, the difference in prices may support rationing product 2 in favor of product 1. This effect will work against the incentive to ration product 1 due to heterogeneous preferences and amplify the need to ration product 2. The combination of these forces determines the optimal rationing policy. May 14, 2013 where 0 denotes the outside option. If 0 is preferred over another product (e.g., [1, 0, 2] ), then the customer does not purchase anything if a more preferred product (product 1 in the example) is not available. We next consider simultaneously the two remaining cases in which the customer's realized preference is either [2, 0, 1] [2, 0, 1] , respectively, then A t = {1, 2} leads to a lower revenue than A t = {1} and the difference is again p − Δ 1 t +1 > 0. Because preferences are constant over time, the probability of observing either sample path is the same and therefore these differences cancel out when expectation is taken over all sample paths. We now consider the second possible scenario. Suppose that the realization of preferences over time is such that y 1 − 1 units of product 1 and y 2 −ỹ 2 units of product 2 are sold through period t − 1, with 1 ≤ỹ 2 ≤ y 2 . Then, if A t = {1, 2}, the revenue in period t − 1 is pC + V t (1,ỹ 2 − 1) under either realized preference of the customer arriving in period t, where C = y 1 + y 2 −ỹ 2 . If A t = {1}, then the revenue in period t − 1 is V t (1,ỹ 2 ) if the customer's realized preference in period t is [2, 0, 1] and pC + V t (0,ỹ 2 ) if the customer's realized preference in period t is [2, 1, 0] . The next table shows the revenue in period t for given realizations of preferences in periods t and t and for a given assortment offered in period t. (Note that we do not consider realizations in which the customer's first preference is product 2, as there is still inventory of that product. The case in which product 2 runs out of inventory first was analyzed earlier.)
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if A t = {1, 2} if A t = {1} [2, 0, 1] [2, 0, 1] pB + V t +1 (ỹ 1 , 0) pB + V t +1 (ỹ 1 , 0) [2, 1, 0] p(B + 1) + V t +1 (ỹ 1 − 1, 0) pB + V t +1 (ỹ 1 , 0) [2, 1, 0] [2, 0, 1] pB + V t +1 (ỹ 1 , 0) p(B + 1) + V t +1 (ỹ 1 − 1, 0) [2, 1, 0] p(B + 1) + V t +1 (ỹ 1 − 1, 0) p(B + 1) + V t +1 (ỹ 1 − 1,
Realized

Revenue in t Revenue in t preference in t preference in t if
Because p − Δ 2 t +1 > 0, we have that under the first three possible combinations of realized preferences shown in the table, the revenue under A t = {1, 2} strictly dominates that under A t = {1}. The last combination of preferences leads to equal revenue in both cases. We conclude that, taking expectation over all possible sample paths, choosing A t = {1, 2} strictly dominates choosing A t = {1}. Therefore, the seller is better off offering both products in period t, concluding the induction argument.
Proposition 2 Proof:
We prove the result by showing that V t (y − e i ) ≥ V t (y − e j ) for any vector of inventory levels with y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y N and any i < j, as this implies that p i t ≥ p j t , leading to the desired result.
We first focus on the last period T . We know that in the last period, it is optimal to offer all products with positive inventory. Let i < j, i.e., 
and
Under the assumption of symmetric demands, we have that
for any two products l ∈ S \ {i}, l ∈ S \ {j} since |S \ {i}| = |S \ {j}|. Therefore, V T (y − e i ) = V T (y − e j ). This proves the result for period T .
Let's now assume that the result holds for period t + 1, i.e., V t+1 (y − e i ) ≥ V t+1 (y − e j ) for any vector of inventory levels y with y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · y N ≥ 1 and any i < j. We want to prove that V t (y − e i ) ≥ V t (y − e j ). From (1), we have V t (y|m) = max S⊂S(y) l∈S λq ml (S)(p + V t+1 (y − e l )) + λq m0 (S)V t+1 (y) + (1 − λ)V t+1 (y).
Let us first assume that y i > 1. Let S * be the set of products that achieves the maximum in the above optimization when the vector of inventory levels is y − e j , S * ⊂ S(y − e j ). Then, V t (y−e j |m) = We only need to verify that S * is a feasible set under the vector of inventory levels y − e i , i.e., that S * ⊂ S(y − e i ). But this holds because S(y − e j ) ⊂ S(y − e i ) since y i ≥ y j and y i > 1. Then, V t (y − e j |m) ≤ V t (y − e i |m) for each segment m, so that m∈M ρ m V t (y − e j |m) ≤ m∈M ρ m V t (y − e i |m). Consider now a vector of inventory levels with y i = 1 (and therefore y j = 1 as well). Following the same reasoning as above, let S * be the set of products that achieves the maximum when the vector of inventory levels is y − e j . Then, S * does not contain product j. If i ∈ S * either, then the same argument as above applies. Suppose that i ∈ S * . As before, V t (y−e j |m) = Therefore, V t (y − e i ) ≥ V t (y − e j ), establishing the result.
Proposition 3 Proof:
We first show that V t (y − e i ) < V t (y − e j ) for i < j and any period t, using induction. If j ∈ S * , then the result is immediate by induction using the fact that S * is a feasible set for the maximization in V t (y − e j |m). Suppose that j ∈ S * . Then, by induction (p+V t+1 (y−e j −e k ))+λ θ 0 (s − 1)θ + θ 0 V t+1 (y−e j )+(1−λ)V t+1 (y−e j ), assortment offered to segment j always contains product j. P4 is an inequality that implies the threshold policy in part (ii), which can be expressed as follows: If it is optimal to offer product j to segment i at inventory level y, then it is also optimal to offer product j to segment i when there is one more unit of inventory of product j, i.e., if p − Δ + e i ) ). P5 implies that if it is optimal to offer product i to segment j at inventory level y, then it is also optimal to offer this product to segment j when the vector of inventory levels is y − e j , that is, y i ≥ y * i (y j − 1). This property implies part (i) of Proposition 4. The proof of each property requires comparing the alternative assortments in the current period given the customer choice probabilities and the continuation value functions based on the implementation of the optimal assortment policy in future periods. This results in a large number of cases to be checked (corresponding to multiple future outcomes), and the properties do not necessarily hold in all cases. Properties 3-5 are used to rule out some cases, and we prove that the remaining cases satisfy the five properties. Details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.
